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The idea of fiscal decentralisation has become increasingly fashionable world-wide. But every 
country has unique features of the intergovernmental fiscal system. In general municipal 
expenditures are rapidly growing in European countries. On the other hand local tax increases 
are not easily enforceable at present, whereas the local fiscal autonomy is unlikely to be 
guaranteed as long as municipalities are strongly dependent on down-flow grants. In such a 
fiscal-stress situation an improvement of local fiscal capacity can be achieved from the 
increase of fees. Four European countries were chosen to survey the recent development of 
municipal finance: Britain, Germany, Poland and Switzerland. This paper firstly identifies and 
highlights the similarities and differences in municipal finance in an international context. 
Secondly it theoretically examines the possibility of enhancing fiscal autonomy of local 
governments through determining optimal fee level which leads to an increase of revenues 
from this revenue item. 
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The idea of decentralisation of political decision-making has become increasingly fash-
ionable world-wide, usually accompanied by fiscal decentralisation. Unfortunately mu-
nicipalities in Europe seem to be presently suffering from a lack of necessary financial
means to cover the increasing public activities and expenditures.
1 The greater sensitivity
of sub-central governments to local preferences achieved through the decentralisation
“may enhance the ability of the provider to identify both recipients’ and citizens’ will-
ingness to pay. [P]eople will be more willing to pay for [public] services that they find
to be responsive to their priorities, especially if [...] they have been in the decision-
making process and [...] costs are clearly perceptible in the process. [In other words]
decentralisation [would] result in a closer approximation to the efficient solution of pro-
vision to the point at which the marginal costs and benefits of provision are equated”
(Darby, Mucastelli and Roy, 2003, p. 14).
2
Regarding the efficient provision of local utilities, Oates (1972) emphasises that pub-
lic expenditures should be assigned in a way that provision of public services is made
by the jurisdiction representing the smallest possible area over which the benefits are
distributed. Although some inefficiencies could be expected from a multiplicity of tiers
of governments (like increased administrative complexity, lack of transparency, clashes
in competencies, etc.), the key principle is that the (optimal) size of the sub-central tiers
should be selected to well match the broad range of services provided under the consid-
eration of economies of scale. This fact in turn implies that economies of scale from
                                                
1 Most common types of public activities legally assigned to local governments include, for example, (a)
land planning and local environmental protection, (b) municipal housing and property management,
(c) local transport systems, (d) water supply and waste disposal, (e) primary health care and social
welfare services, (f) elementary education, (g) culture and sport, fire protection, etc. Yet goods pub-
licly provided have quite often a character of mixed goods, for which some degree of decentralisation
combined with some centralised co-ordination appears to be feasible and desirable, due to unclear dis-
tribution of benefits among regions, externalities and spill-overs, etc. Furthermore, the central gov-
ernment in many countries can influence the decentralised provision of public goods through the
regulation of their delivery in terms of quality and the ex-post control of the use of financial means
and transfers.
2  A complete fiscal autonomy can also be disadvantageous. First of all, regional and municipal dispari-
ties in income and wealth will lead to different levels of tax revenues in the individual jurisdictions.
Secondly, the tax exportation between sub-national jurisdictions can be avoided when taxes are as-
signed to different levels of government. Thirdly, the mobility of production factors accompanied by
tax competition imposes limits on fiscal autonomy. For this reason the most decentralised taxation
systems still assign the corporate taxes (on capital) to central government. Finally, fiscal decentralisa-
tion can cause administrative complexity in tax collection and provision of public utilities (Blankart
and Borck, 2003). The devolution of expenditure responsibilities to local governments can create con-
flict with the achievement of the macro-economic stabilisation and the re-distributive goal (Oates, 1972).
Empirical investigations (including Brosio, 1985) do not always confirm the so-called Leviathan hy-
pothesis by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) that decentralisation generally limits the growth of total gov-
ernment expenditures.3
joint consumption of public services set a limit to an ever decreasing size of local gov-
ernments. According to Tullock (1969), such a problem can be solved by external con-
tracting with large private suppliers or other governments to obtain a service, only if the
service is tangible and its quality and standard are safeguarded.
In the provision of infrastructure, local governments tend to (critically) consider an in-
crease in local taxes.
3 The traditional Tiebout model of revealed preference (1956) postu-
lates “that [citizens] would choose to locate in jurisdictions that provide them with the mix
of public services [and the local tax burden] that maximise their welfare. [... Those who]
are dissatisfied with the given pattern in their area would [...] move to areas where the pat-
tern [better corresponds their preferences]. So under certain assumptions, diversity of pro-
vision [of local utilities and tax burden] combined with consumer mobility can lead to the
Pareto-optimal provision [of municipal services]” (Darby, Muscatelli and Roy, 2003, p.
14).
In practice, three main options of assigning funds to local jurisdictions are commonly
adopted:
•   assignment of (some) taxing power to the central government and financing local ex-
penditure needs by intergovernmental grants or other transfers, for example, in the
form of sharing tax revenues,
•   assignment of (some) taxing power to the local governments, if necessary comple-
menting the revenues (raised locally) with tax-sharing arrangements with the central
government (Norregaard, 1997; Nam and Radulescu, 2003), and
•   assignment of rights or requirements to charge fees for financing municipal services.
Intergovernmental transfers are aimed at rectifying not only the vertical imbalance
caused by the unequal own tax revenues and expenditures of different levels of govern-
ments but also the horizontal imbalance that results from the different fiscal capacities
among same level jurisdictions. In the cases of existing externalities on other jurisdictions,
the central government also needs to financially support sub-national authorities in order
to guarantee the provision of certain public services on the local level like pollution con-
trol, inter-regional highways, etc. (Davis and Lucker, 1982; Dahlby, 1996). Furthermore,
the amount of grants should vary with the local expenditure needs and inversely with lo-
cal fiscal capacity, while their distribution must be transparent and fair. More importantly,
an effective transfer system should neither encourage overspending nor weaken tax col-
                                                
3  There are several characteristics for typical local taxes: (a) Their base should be neither very mobile nor
very unevenly distributed among jurisdictions. Otherwise taxpayers will relocate the income activities or
tax sources from high to low areas; (b) They should be accountable and local taxpayers should know
what the tax liabilities are. In addition, they should be fairly easy to administer on the local level; (c) The
link between payment of the tax and local service received should be intact; (d) Local taxes should be
able to generate sufficient revenues to avoid large vertical imbalances and ideally be less sensitive to the4
lection efforts on the sub-national level (Jones and Cullis, 1994; Shah, 1994a and 1994b;
Nam, Parsche and Steinherr, 2001).
Basically the re-allocation of fiscal resources from one level of government to another
takes place through the sharing of tax revenues or through a form of grants. In the case of
revenue sharing, tax bases can be shared on a tax-by-tax basis, or taxes can be pooled and
shared systematically thereafter. According to the previous experiences in emerging
countries, such revenue sharing arrangements appear to be less successful in encouraging
local revenue mobilisation (Fukasaku and de Mello, 1999). Grants from higher (federal or
state) to lower levels (state or local) can be conditional or unconditional respecting the
autonomy of local governments in spending such financial means. The block grants also
have a fixed character, which are, however, designed to support broad areas of local ac-
tivities (like education, environmental preservation, etc.) rather than specific projects.
Borrowing has traditionally been an important source to finance long-term public infra-
structure projects in advanced countries because it enhances intergenerational equity. In
other words, these projects yield returns over several generations, during which the costs
for the provision of public goods should be shared equally. This type of intergenerational
burden-sharing enables small local governments to undertake the necessary large scale
infrastructure investments. However, some countries still impose strict restrictions on
local borrowing. For example, in some developing and transition countries large infra-
structure projects have recently been more strongly supported in terms of capital grants or
lending from higher level governments, since local governments, especially in small enti-
ties (due to their weak economic power, small size of tax income and other unfavourable
creditworthiness) quite often suffer from the lack of direct access to credit markets. Fiscal
deficits and debt have continuously risen over time in a large number of countries both at
the state and local levels. The rapid growth of local public debt in a country, which even-
tually endangers the macro-economic stability, also immediately questions whether the
local borrowing is tightly oriented to the necessary financial needs for well-designed local
public projects and whether its process is transparent and efficient enough in an adminis-
trative sense.
4
                                                                                                                                              
changes in business cycle (Oates, 1972; King, 1984). In accordance with such criteria land or property
taxes and, to some extent, personal income taxes have quite often been suggested as suitable local taxes.
4  In general there are four basic debt-control categories: (a) primary reliance on market discipline with-
out the bail-out guarantee of the central government when the credit market is free and transparent in-
formation prevails, (b) a dialogue-oriented co-operation and negotiation among different levels of
governments in the design and implementation of debt controls (including limits on the indebtedness
of sub-national governments), (c) rules-based controls as specified in the constitution or by law re-
garding, for example, setting purpose- or project-oriented limits on the absolute level of local debts,
and (d) direct administrative controls of the central government over local borrowing, including setting
of annual limits on the overall debt of individual sub-national jurisdictions, the tight review and
authorisation of individual borrowing operations like credit approvals (or the centralisation of all gov-
ernment borrowing) and ex-post monitoring, etc. (Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997). In Britain basic5
Apart from taxation, public debts and intergovernmental fiscal resource allocations,
other modes of finance are relevant for the fiscal autonomy of local governments. They
comprise revenues from fees, public enterprise activities, public-private partnership,
privatisation, shifting of bureaucratic burdens to other public or private bodies, collect-
ing tributes, revenues from sanctions, concession payments
5 etc. In previous years the
issues on fees levied by local governments have not been adequately investigated by
public finance experts.
In many countries municipal fees have recently been considerably increased, which
has led to an expansion of local revenues from this item. “[C]oncerns over the distor-
tionary effects of tax financing, fairness and a wish to make costs more perceptible to
consumers are all factors that potentially support increases in the scope of user charges.
[In particular, the OECD] has been critical of low reliance on user charges by various
[member] countries in the areas of child care, care of elderly and pharmaceuticals.
Trends in these areas suggest that the take-up of free services is booming and that sup-
ply-side rationing is considerable. The provision of services free of charge, or without
making costs perceptible, obviously risks prompting excessive demand and hitting sup-
ply constraints, because the social costs of supply are largely irrelevant for the individ-
ual. User charges offer the potential of gaining more information about price sensitivity
of demand for services and can potentially render demand pressure directly influential
rather than being expressed indirectly and imperfectly through the electoral system.
Demand pressures may also be influential on supply-side efficiency. However user
charging will be viable only if the costs of collection and of compensation through the
benefit system are low relative to the sums that can be levied and the efficiency gains
that result. Countries that have tried to increase reliance on fees and charges have gen-
erally aimed at striking a balance between copayment and maximum contribution to
avoid imposing unduly high expenses on some households” (Darby, Muscatelli and
Roy, 2003, p. 29).
As long as profits of public enterprises are yielded from fees, the fiscal autonomy of
a municipality is widened. Yet, higher fee revenues that stem from higher sales of pub-
lic goods by the given fee level require a large-scale production. In countries like Ger-
many there are laws that strictly stipulate the cost coverage of local public firms but do
                                                                                                                                              
approvals for loans for individual municipalities are made on the basis of their general need to spend
on capital and their usable capital receipts. Specific credit approvals are issued in response to a spe-
cific requirement and purpose. Local governments in Britain are not allowed to take credit for financ-
ing current expenditures. In Poland total local and regional government debt and loan repayment
(principal and interest) must not exceed 60% and 15% of the authority’s annual income respectively
(Council of Europe, 2000).
5  Such concessions include rights to provide energy, to organise passenger traffic, to use the municipal
territory for storage, to organise markets, to use urban land for manufacturing, housing, gas lines,
electricity and communication infrastructure (Friedrich, Gwiazda and Nam, 2003).6
not allow profit-making (Wienbracke, 2004). As shortly mentioned before, fees allow to
close the interest or preference gap between the group of people demanding a public
good and those who have to finance its provision. Consequently, charges signal a more
clear responsibility for public goods production. Due to this reason fees can also better
enable to internalise spill-overs when providing public goods (Rehm, 2004). If there are
special expenditure needs of certain citizen groups, the provision of such goods and
services does not necessarily reflect the entire public interests. In this case the provision
appears to be better financed by fees. In this context fees act as a barrier against social-
ising local utilities as well. In some cases local investment projects appear to only be
financed through charges since other financial means are not available. Credits for fi-
nancing local projects can also be more easily available, if they are self-financed through
the collection of fees. The fiscal consequences of expectation and claim for municipal
services can be shown more convincingly, if charges are clearly identified. The infor-
mation obtained through cost assessment to calculate fees also contributes to other pur-
poses of municipal management and finance. Quite often the increase in fees is not taken
into account the improvement of local fiscal capacity indicator when calculating the ex-
tent of down-flow transfers. As a consequence grants tend to remain unaffected, although
the local receipts from user charges increase. Fees are important when forming a public-
private partnership, because there is the need to cover cost or allow payment of interests
on common equity capital. Otherwise the private partner would not willing to join the
partnership.
In general municipal expenditures are rapidly growing in European countries. On the
other hand, local tax increases are not easily enforceable at present, whereas the local
fiscal autonomy is unlikely to be guaranteed as long as municipalities are strongly de-
pendent on down-flow grants. In such a fiscal-stress situation an improvement of local
fiscal capacity can be achieved from the increase of fees. Four European countries were
chosen to survey the recent development of municipal finance: Britain, Germany, Po-
land and Switzerland. This paper firstly identifies and highlights the similarities and
differences in municipal finance in an international context. By doing so the signifi-
cance of fees as municipal revenue source is examined. Secondly it theoretically exam-
ines the possibility of enhancing fiscal autonomy of local governments through deter-
mining optimal fee level which leads to an increase of revenues from this revenue item.7
2. Empirical Relevance of Fees for Municipal Finance in the Se-
lected European Countries
6
Four European countries were chosen to survey the recent development of local finance:
Britain, Germany, Poland and Switzerland. By doing so the significance of fees as mu-
nicipal revenue source is examined. The former three countries are EU members; Ger-
many is also in the euro zone. Regarding the national constitution Britain is centrally
structured, while Switzerland and Germany are federal states. Poland also guarantees a
substantial degree of municipal autonomy but which is limited compared to that of
Germany and Switzerland. Moreover, Poland and the eastern part of Germany are tran-
sition economies. Among the selected EU nations and candidates, Germany is the only
country currently suffering from the difficulties of satisfying the Maastricht conver-
gence criteria. Switzerland would probably be at the Maastricht limits if it were a mem-
ber. Britain and Poland presently are among those European countries with an above-
average GDP growth rate, whereas Switzerland and Germany have recently experienced
rather moderate or low growth. Furthermore the number of native inhabitants of Euro-
pean origin is gradually shrinking in Germany and Britain, whereas the corresponding
share of the Swiss population has remained rather stable. At present this is not an im-
portant issue in Poland. Due to these different economic, fiscal and institutional charac-
teristics of the investigated countries, one could a priori expect that the local finance
system and its development would differ from one country to another.
Overall one can find an increase in total municipal expenditures in the 1990s for all
four investigated countries: Germany, Poland, Switzerland and Britain. In Germany
total expenditures grew about 23% from approximately €134 billion in 1991 to €165
billion in 2000 with a strong increase until the mid-1990s. Afterwards they slightly de-
clined and started to rise again after 1997. This development can mainly be attributed to
the transformation process of the former GDR, which required investments in different
sectors. Municipal expenditures in Switzerland gradually increased from €18 billion in
1990 to €27 billion in 2000; that is equivalent to an increase of 47%. Only in 1997 there
was a slight reduction. Compared to Germany and Switzerland total expenditures in-
creased even stronger in Britain, namely about 82% from €88 billion in 1990/91 to €160
billion in 2001/02. The development of municipal expenditures is remarkable in Poland:
They amounted to €3.4 billion in 1992 but reached €9.8 billion ten years later. In part
                                                
6  All figures concerning municipal expenditures and revenues for Germany can be found in Statistische
Bundesamt (2003a), p. 12 and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003b), p. 517, for Switzerland in Bundesamt
für Statistik (2003), p. 806 and p. 800, for Britain at the UK Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
(2003 and former years) and for Poland in Polish Official Statistics, Regional Data Bank,
http://www.stat.gov.pl. For Britain we examine the development of municipal revenues and expendi-
tures in England representatively, since data for the entire territory are not available.8
this three-fold expansion reflects the impact of the transformation process: Polish gmi-
nas (communes) were underdeveloped and investments were necessary to build up
(public) infrastructure of all kinds.
More immediately the development of local expenditures was triggered by the strong
increase of social welfare/health care and education expenses which are at the same
time one of the largest expenditure categories in the investigated countries (see Figure
1).
7







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































       Source: Ifo Institute
In fact there was an increase of expenditures for schooling of about 9% in Germany in
the 1990s but this share still amounts to less then 10% in 2000. Expenditures for educa-
tion increased nearly 52% in Switzerland and 67% in Britain in the same time period.
This strong increase in both countries does not reflect an underdeveloped education
system as it existed in Poland after the socialistic era, but shows that Switzerland and
Britain attach importance to the improvement of schooling and education. This is also
likely to happen in Germany.
                                                
7  Important municipal expenditures are also staff expenses (with a share of 9% in Germany, 8% in Swit-
zerland and nearly 14% in Poland), expenses for construction, housing and traffic (with a share of 12%
in Germany and 7% in Switzerland), telecommunication (in Poland the share of these expenditures in-
creased from 2% to 11% in ten years), public facilities and business promotion (with a share of 10% in
Germany), general finance and communal economy.9
Expenditures for social aid increased about 46% in Germany until 1995. New federal
laws, which directed insurance agencies to take care of the elderly people, placed limits
on social aid and reduced nursing fees, leading to a decrease in social welfare expendi-
tures in the following years. But after 1999 they rose again so that one can notice an
increase of these expenditures of 33% for the whole 1990s and they reached a share of
about 27% of total municipal expenditures in 2000. In the same period expenditures for
social welfare increased by about 96% in Switzerland, but they only comprise a share of
15% of total municipal expenditures. But together with expenditures for health care,
which increased from €3 billion to nearly €5 billion in 2000, the share amounted to
33%. Although one can notice an increase of 206% of these expenditures in Britain in
the studied period, the share of social welfare is with 16% by far not as high as in Ger-
many and Switzerland. Concerning expenditures for health care and social welfare in
Poland, one can observe an increase in their share until 1995. Thereafter this share de-
clined to 13% of total municipal expenditures in 2002. Thus a change in the social sys-
tem took place during the transformation process, although its scale is not as large as the
one in Germany. Regarding the forthcoming problems in this sector, this can be a com-
parative advantage of the country.
To prevent a continued increase of the expenditures for social welfare followed by
demographic changes, reforms have to take place as soon as possible. Otherwise the
share of social aid expenses to total municipal expenditures will continue to grow, not
only in Germany and Switzerland, countries with a mature social system, but also Brit-
ish and Polish municipalities will need more financial resources – like fees – to cover
these expenses.
Local revenues correspondingly grew in all four countries over the investigated pe-
riod: In Germany the amount increased from about €100 billion in 1991 to €145 billion
in 1995, which reflects the unification boom in the municipalities of the former GDR.
After a drop to €141 billion in 1997 due to a reduction of current grants, local revenues
reached €148 billion in 2000. Tax revenues increased – except for slight business cycle
fluctuations – until 2000, because of the participation of (western German) municipali-
ties in income taxation and the local business tax, i.e. a tax on profit. Moreover, German
municipalities have increased property and business tax rates. In Switzerland municipal
revenues also gradually increased from €18 billion in 1990 to €29 billion in 2000. Fur-
thermore, tax revenues, which represent the main source of revenues, continued to rise
with exception of 1996. However, the share of these revenues relatively decreased over
the years from 49% to 46% because fees and charges have gained importance (see Fig-
ure 2). For Britain one can observe an increase in total revenues of over 85% in the pe-
riod from 1990/91 to 2001/2002. They increased from about €87 billion to nearly €160
billion. As in Switzerland the absolute sum of tax revenues grew in Britain from €3310
billion in 1990/91 to €50 billion in 2001/2002 but with a decrease in their share. The
reason for this development can be seen in the pattern of the revenues from intergov-
ernmental grants and transfers which more than doubled. While total revenues of mu-
nicipalities in Poland amounted only to €3 billion in 1992, they substantially increased
until 2002 to more than €9 billion. This corresponds to a three-fold expansion in ten
years, which was triggered by the transformation process from a communist state to-
wards political decentralisation and by the EU membership since 2004.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































* For Poland and the Britain grants/transfers also include revenues from tax sharing.
                 Source: Ifo Institute
German municipalities are strongly dependent on intergovernmental grants, which pri-
marily serve to finance current expenditures in the fields of education, culture, social
welfare, health, municipal public facilities and municipal firms and also partly assist in
debt servicing and investment financing for local infrastructure projects.
8 They in-
creased by 65% from 1991 (€ 46 billion) to 2000 (€ 76 billion) with a peak in 1995,
where they amounted to €78 billion or nearly 54% of total revenues. In the following
two years intergovernmental grants declined, as social welfare expenditures were re-
                                                
8  Investment grants remained relatively stable although the relation between current and investment
grants has changed continuously in the western municipalities in favour of the former type. In the east-
ern part of Germany over 50% of all local revenues were based on grants due to lagging tax revenues.
During the transformation process investment grants continually played an important role. Due to the
reduction of expenses for services and the respective number of staff, outsourcing of services, privati-
sation, etc., current grants did not grow strongly in general.11
duced.
9 But they started to rise again as of 1999 and grants reached a share of 51% of
total revenues in 2000. Intergovernmental grants and transfers are also of great impor-
tance for the municipalities in Britain and Poland. In Britain they more than doubled in
the period from 1990/91 (€ 32 billion) to 2001/2002 (€ 73 billion) and have presently
reached a share of 45% of total revenues. This process was driven by the efforts to de-
centralise the country and to make each municipality economically more competitive.
As the political responsibility of municipal governments has not been fully covered by
the equivalent financial authority, the payment of grants is the only way to achieve this.
The same reason holds for Polish gminas. Because of the communist regime only grants
and transfers have been used in the preceding decades as an instrument to finance the
necessary development of rural areas and to pursue the goal of fiscal decentralisation.
So Poland experienced an increase in its share of grants and transfers from 53% to 64%
between 1992 and 2002. Although grants from central government and the respective
cantons to municipalities in Switzerland also grew considerably in the 1990s, namely by
about 76%, there is a clear difference to other investigated nations: Swiss municipalities
are not as dependent on them, and in 2000 only about 15% of total revenues were at-
tributed to grants.
The dependence on grants can be seen in Figure 3 which illustrates the development
of the share of own revenues over expenditures from 1990 to 2002 for the four coun-
tries. Important is the fact that own municipal revenues exclude grants and so the de-
pendence of local authorities on grants is also implicitly shown.
                                                
9  This is the consequence of new regulations related to asylum seekers, health care for the elderly peo-
ple, further outsourcing and service reductions, changes in legal forms of public facility activities and
reduction in local investments.12





















































          Source: Ifo Institute
Whereas for Swiss municipalities there is only a weak dependence on payments from
the higher tiers of government, which has been decreasing since 1998, German, British
and Polish local authorities are strongly depend on grants. One reason for the huge
amount of grants for German municipalities in the 1990s is probably the transformation
process of the former GDR. Therefore one tends to expect a sharp change in the extent
of grant payments in the coming years, because the transformation process will be
slowly ‘completed’. But this is unlikely to occur, since German municipalities are enti-
tled by law to receive financial resources (tax revenues and grants) for their tasks trans-
ferred from the state government. High grant payments are a typical consequence of this
system and so German local authorities are not – in fiscal terms – fully autonomous. In
contrast, the administrative and fiscal activities of Swiss cantons and municipalities are
closely interwoven and the terms ‘joint execution’ and ‘joint responsibility’ are often
used. This intensive co-operation at the cantonal and communal level is permitted by the
federal and cantonal constitutions (Dafflon, 1999). Thus grant payments do not play a
major role in Switzerland.
The reason for the increasing dependence of Polish municipalities on grants in the
1990s can be seen – as already mentioned – in the transformation process, which causes
not only the privatisation of state owned firms but also the fiscal decentralisation of the
country. This process will sooner or later come to an end. Furthermore, Figure 3 shows13
that municipalities in Britain also were strongly dependent on grant payments in the
1990s, which reflects the dominant role of the central government in local finance mat-
ters. There is no sign that there will be a big change in the future in these two countries.
Regarding the development of municipal revenues from fees (and other current re-
ceipts) in Germany this item has been gradually decreasing since 1995, and in 2000 its
share reached the level of 1992. This decrease can be attributed to the budget consoli-
dation of western and eastern German municipalities which led to a reduction of per-
sonnel costs, the outsourcing of local activities, the establishment of municipal firms as
well as the closing-down of institutions and privatisation. In contrast to Germany, reve-
nues from fees have increased by 81% in Switzerland in the last decade. Current costs
such as staff costs, material costs, interests or depreciation allowances have increased
and so Swiss municipalities were forced to charge higher fees since they encountered
difficulties in raising tax rates. Fees have gained importance in the last years, while tax
revenues have become less important in Switzerland. In Poland the share of fees and
charges decreased to less than 2% in the studied period. The transformation process
accompanied by privatisation and closure of several firms has caused this reduction in
Polish gminas.
As municipal expenditures will grow in the future – they have already done so in the
last decade as already shown – municipalities will be forced to generate a new source of
income. Because of the increasing tax competition in a further growing EU, tax in-
creases are not easily enforceable.
10 Furthermore there is little scope to enlarge grant
payments since higher tiers of government have to stabilise their budget situation and
fiscal autonomy will particularly not be ensured as long as municipalities are dependent
on grants. Therefore municipalities opt to act like Switzerland and increase fees to meet
expenditures. The development pattern of revenues from fees and charges in British
municipalities also confirms this trend: Whereas the share of fees and charges in terms
of total revenues decreased from 21% to 19% due to the above average increase in grant
payments, the total amount of this item increased by about 67% from 1990/91 to
2001/02. So in the future an increasing share of fees in Germany, Britain and Poland is
anticipated as already happened in Switzerland.
                                                
10 The current discussion about a reform of the German tax system, the purpose of which is to simplify
the existing fiscal system accompanied by decreasing tax rates for every income group, strengthen this
argument.14
3.  Determination of Optimal Level of Fees
3.1. Normative Aspects of Determining Fees
In previous years the issues on fees levied by local governments have not been ade-
quately investigated by public finance experts, although there are some academic dis-
cussions on the principles of fixing fees (Bird, 1976; Seldon, 1977; Grossekettler, 1985;
Wagner, 1991; Sacksofsky and Wieland, 2000). There are normative aspects related to
the ways of determining fees to increase social welfare. According to a welfare func-
tion, the social marginal benefits of a public service should be equal to the marginal
social costs of the same service. The social marginal benefits expressed in terms of
willingness to pay for the service have to be equal to the marginal willingness to pay
against the provision of the service, if the social net benefit concept is adopted instead
of a welfare function. Such different types of willingness can be reflected in consumer
surplus, sales, monetary terms for positive external effects subtracted by producer sur-
plus, costs and monetary terms for negative external effects.
If the welfare expression is restricted to consumer surplus and sales subtracted by the
related costs, the marginal cost pricing principle applies for fixing fees. With increasing
marginal costs in a monopoly the amount of fee appears to be desirable, which satisfies
the condition that the fee per service unit is the same as the corresponding marginal
costs and, at the same time, allows profits (Oort, 1961; Lösenbeck, 1963; Nelson, 1964;
Thiemeyer, 1964 and 1970; Krelle, 1976; Bös, 1981). In this case the application of
peak load pricing is also possible (Turvey, 1971; Bätz, 1979; Blankart, 1980; Wirl,
1991). Sometimes institutional framework, organisational and legal forms require a bal-
anced budget for the public institution providing the service. In cases with falling mar-
ginal costs the prices corresponding to marginal costs lead to losses, and the budget
problems occur. For that purpose the so-called Ramsey-pricing (Ramsey, 1927; Bös,
1986), the Feldstein-prices considering cost coverage (Wirl, 1991) and the péage sys-
tems (Hutter, 1950; Boiteux, 1951; Allais, 1984) were developed for determining fees.
In terms of cost effectiveness analysis fees are set to cover the cost required for the de-
livery of maximal output (Friedrich, 1969; Krelle, 1976). In the utility analysis, on the
other hand, fees are determined under the consideration of maximising sales and re-
ceipts from concessions (Friedrich, 1969), employment maximisation (Hansmeyer and
Fürst, 1968; Bös, 1986), regional economic goals (Thiemeyer, 1975) and vote maximi-
sation (Blankart, 1980; Ziemes, 1992). The so-called commercial-pricing offers the
rules that can also be welfare-oriented (Shepherd, 1965; Friedrich, 1969). However,
these principles do not consider whether the determination of fees is related to central
government, state or municipal government.15
The conventional welfare-oriented literature on fees mainly examines the welfare
maximisation of the central government for the entire nation, taking into account the
willingness to pay on the part of all the citizens (Friedrich, 1971). The welfare of a sub-
state in a federation or a municipality cannot be easily detected through the net benefit
approach, since prices do not only reflect the willingness to pay of people in the state or
municipality investigated. For instance, consumer surplus, turnover, producer surplus,
etc. show the judgements of non-state or non-municipal residence, commuters and also
people from abroad. The benefit-cost analysis, oriented to the isolated welfare maximi-
sation of a sub-state or a municipality, makes an evaluation in monetary terms possible.
Sales, consumer surplus, costs etc. have to be re-defined and special deferrals have to be
made. Sales to non-residents can be interpreted as exports, and procurements from non-
residential citizens and economic units can be classified as imports. A willingness-to-
use indicator for export surplus, taxes from other residence etc. may be developed as
well. Many more changes must be introduced in the evaluation schemes (Friedrich,
1971). When determining the optimal size of fees, quite different marginal costs and
marginal benefits emerge, and the marginal cost pricing produces other values than the
average fee equal to the state or municipal relevant costs. Therefore, the welfare-
oriented fee determination does not deliver satisfactory guidelines to find the optimal
level of fees.
Moreover, researchers assume monopolistic market forms to determine fees for the
supply of municipal services. This is true in some exceptional cases like a marriage li-
cense bureau. However, one quite often finds oligopolies such as convention halls,
theatres, swimming pools, municipal garbage plants, municipal banks, or oligopsonies
like business promotion agencies. The monopolistic competition can emerge or there are
near polypolies, for example, if schools can be chosen by parents. Marginal cost pricing
is also mainly related to the oligopolies. Often other parameters of action, such as serv-
ice times, are not considered in welfare-oriented approaches (Friedrich, 1978). For the
formation of fees the whole range of sales instruments and production management
should be considered. Thus the welfare-oriented fee determination does not provide
satisfactory guidelines to find an optimal level.
Those fee-collecting public institutions, such as administrative units and public en-
terprises, can have many organisational forms of public and private laws, which also
prescribe different regulations for the formation of fees. Therefore, there are actually
very different pricing policies allowed, which range from acceptable (not maximal)
profits for public enterprises to substantial losses in order to promote the receipt of
services (theatres, etc.). Moreover, the fee-collecting public economic units and their
pricing policies are used as instruments for economic policy-making (Oettle, 1998) or as
instruments for promoting regional competition (Friedrich and Feng, 2000). Munici-16
palities can also try to create profits and revenues to consolidate their budget in the
framework of legal possibilities, or they may follow political aims such as winning
votes (Thiemeyer, 1975). Therefore, a bundle of different goals may underlie the for-
mation of fees.
A municipality can also establish a local enterprise of public or private law to provide
services. Then the municipality may try to receive gains from the public enterprise in
the framework of legal possibilities. If it happens in the form of public law, legal re-
quirements for cost coverage exist (Zwehl, 1991; Gawel, 1995; Gottschalk, 1998; Siek-
mann, 1998; Tettinger, 1998; Färber, 2000; Rehm, 2004). However, due to the auton-
omy to shape the cost-accounting scheme and the consideration of costs not leading to
financial outflows like imputed cost for depreciation (Zimmermann, 2003) or non-
realised risks, wages for entrepreneurial management, etc. and the application of differ-
ent cost assessment and distribution methods, fiscal receipts can be gained (Friedrich,
1998; Wienbracke, 2004). Although municipal firms of private law underlie cost cover-
age pricing requirements (Tettinger, 1998), their legal possibilities for achieving profits
are larger. Therefore fees can be determined by the special principal-agent relations as
well.
Nowadays the private public partnership is developed especially on the local level.
Here many legal solutions seem to be possible (Gottschalk, 1998). Fees can be collected
by a municipality, whereas production and distribution of services may be organised by
a private enterprise selling its services to the municipality. In this case the level of fees
strongly depends on the type of contract made between the local government and the
private firm and on higher or lower costs occurring to the private firm, as well as on the
legal requirements, such as laws related to public procurement and price-setting be-
tween the two parties mentioned above.
In order to limit the number of objectives to be achieved when fixing fees, some re-
quirements are legally suggested. In Poland and Germany the benefit principle is ap-
plied in the form of cost-coverage requirements (Borodo, 2003; Bohley, 2004). In Ger-
many similar state laws exist that regulate the fee determination of municipalities
(Siekmann,1998; Tettinger, 1998). In Switzerland it is up to the regulations of the indi-
vidual cantons to determine how municipalities charge for local services. In Britain
there are many different regulations with respect to charging for public services.
Whether those normatively based user-charge policies improve the fiscal situation of
municipalities depends on whether loss avoidance or profits are possible or probable. To
examine this possibility a positive theory for fee levying administrative units and public
enterprises should be developed.17
3.2. Positive Theories of Fees
Public administrative units (public office) charging fees attempt to achieve public goals
by providing goods and services to other economic units (e.g. businesses and consum-
ers). They possess the long-term stock of production factors and their management
should be competent regarding the essential decisions related to production and deliv-
ery. Public offices comprise legally dependent institutions fully integrated into the
budget planning. Fees are normally not for direct disposal of such an administrative
unit.
A public firm is separated from the owner’s budget planning (Eichhorn and Friedrich,
1976). Such a firm shows some characteristics similar to a private firm, since they are
also oriented to sales and markets (Friedrich, 1969 and 1992; Rees, 1976; Turvey, 1971;
Thiemeyer, 1975; Blankart, 1980; Bös, 1981; Püttner, 1985; Mühlenkamp, 1994). On
the other hand it is obliged to achieve public goals, which are fixed by an owner, by a
regulatory agency or by law, or which are determined within the decision-making units
of the public enterprise. Some public enterprises are subject to special fee regulations
prescribed in state and national laws or the pricing policy guidelines of the firm owners.
3.2.1. Standard Fee Determination for a Municipal Firm
A simple model of a public firm serves as a basis for a theory of public firms and makes
it possible to integrate many aspects of fee policies into the model. The following model
of a public firm comprises (Friedrich, 1992 and 1998; Friedrich and Feng, 2000):
•   A utility (goal) function U of the public firm’s management showing management
utility dependent on output X and labour input L.
(1) UU ( X , L ) = , X
' U/ X U ∂∂ = , L
' U/ L U ∂∂ =
•   A restriction concerning the production function. There is one fixed factor A and
two variable factors of production, L = labour and C = materials.
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•   A demand function shows the dependency between price P and volume X of output
sold
(3)  PP ( X ) = , P/ X P' 0 ∂∂=<
•   The cost function demonstrates fixed costs KA and two types of variable costs. The
factor price of labour is w and that of materials is i.
(4)  A KK w Li C =+ ⋅ + ⋅
•   A restriction, according to which sales turnover is the same as costs, is introduced.
We assume self-financing of the public firm.
(5)  A P(X) X K w L i C ⋅= +⋅+ ⋅
•   Maximisation of utility of management under the restrictions mentioned above leads
to the following Lagrange equation:
(6)  A U(X,L) (P X K w L i C) Λ= +λ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ − ⋅ , while XA f ( L , C ) =⋅
The following first-order conditions of maximisation are delivered,
(7) A P(X) X K w L i C 0
∂Λ
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which yield two optimality conditions. One concerns the equivalence of the relation of
marginal utilities of marginal factor-inputs to the proportion of respective marginal
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Corresponding to the various utility functions, different cost curves emerge. An output-
maximising public firm shows the curves of minimal costs. If output and labour are
evaluated positively, then a curve of higher costs results. If only labour has a positive
weight is the cost curve more unfavourable, and if management needs labour compen-
sation in case of higher production, the cost curve is located even far higher.
The restriction may also refer to a given desired profit requiring a given difference
between turnover and costs. However, the results do not change fundamentally. The
result of the model is shown graphically in Figure 4. The second quadrant demonstrates
the sales conditions of the public firm. For each volume of sale a turnover and the refer-
ring financial revenues are generated that are used to cover costs. After deducting fixed
costs KA a cash flow is available to finance variable costs. The so-called output-labour
curve illustrates all output labour combinations that can be financed. However only one
production volume X corresponds to each sales volume, therefore only two points on
the output-labour curve shown in the second quadrant are relevant. One production is
material-intensive and the other one is labour-intensive. For alternative turnovers and
corresponding production volumes a set of output-labour curves and a set of relevant
material-intensive and labour-intensive points result. Their connection leads to a frontier
of production possibility on the labour-output curve indicated as a thick curve in this
quadrant. Introducing a set of indifference curves that correspond to the management
utility function (1), the highest indifference curve that the management can achieve
touches the frontier of production possibility on the output-labour curve at point F. This
determines the optimal production volume A, the optimal price B and the optimal turn-
over D. Moreover, there is a path of tangency points between alternative possible out-
put-labour curves, which correspond to alternative demand curves of the public firms.
They are related to the cost curves mentioned above.20
Figure 4: Theory of the public firm
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If the management utility function depends on output only, management maximises
output (Type II) and the (cost-minimising) cost function results. Utility functions de-
pending on output and labour (Type I) lead to paths more to the right of the cost mini-
mal path in the right hand quadrant. If the public firm is going to maximise labour input
(Type III) then a path emerges, which connects those tangency points near the respec-
tive maximal turnover volumes. If the utility function (1) depends on profit and the re-
striction (2) is not binding but just a profit definition, then we end up with a maximum
profit (Type IV) solution along the cost minimal path. In rare cases the owner of public
enterprise tries to use its public firm to raise local revenues (Friedrich, 1998; Friedrich
and Feng, 2002). The respective solution would, in turn, lead to a higher price and a
smaller output than former solutions. A utility function depending on profit and labour
(Type V) results in a solution between the profit maximal and the labour maximal price.
The related output and fee solutions are illustrated in Figure 4 and Figure 5.21
Figure 5: Solutions according to types of management
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3.2.2. Determination of Fees According to Investment Rules
The fee level can also be found by the application of investment rules (Friedrich, 1969).
In Figure 6 different fee sizes of a charging public firm are shown, and the resulting cost
curve and the turnover curve are depicted. Because of the positive evaluation of output
(output maximisation or output- and labour-dependent utility maximisation as men-
tioned above), the intersection of turnover and the cost curve turns out as the solution
for determining output and price. For a given utility function of management the better
solution allowing the higher output level is located always to the right. The point and
respective output where the location-oriented cost curves cross is called the critical out-
put.
Hence we can derive the following rules for user charges of the public enterprise (see
Figure 7):
•   If the critical output can be sold at profit, the production process is the best where
the relevant cost curve shows the lower marginal costs than another one.
•   If the critical output that is smaller than that at maximal turnover cannot be sold at
profit, the production process with the lower marginal costs is the best one.
•   If the critical output that is bigger than that at maximal turnover cannot be sold at
profit, the production process with higher marginal costs is the best one.22
Figure 6: Fees corresponding to different sizes of public enterprise
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The solution illustrated in Figure 5 can also be applied if a required absolute profit has
to be achieved. The cost curves get marked up by the profits and the rules apply to the
resulting curves.
Figure 7: Different fees according to different critical outputs
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3.2.3. Negotiation Solution between Management of Public Firm and Local Gov-
ernment as Owner
The model introduced above is useful as well if there is another decision-maker at a
higher level, such as the owner government, who has a utility preference function con-
cerning the output and the financial means. For the initial attempt we consider the
owner government a very powerful principal, e.g. the management of the public firm
needs additional financial means from the owner, the legal form of the public firm guar-
antees high competence of the owner government, etc. It is able to command the man-23
agement of the public firm serving the principal as an agent. However, it should not
totally lose the co-operation of the public firm’s management, for this management is
needed to realise the location choice. Therefore, the public management of the firm has
to receive a minimum utility to guarantee their willingness to perform.
This approach was applied to determine actions of municipal competition through lo-
cal enterprises (Friedrich and Feng, 2000). The utility function of the public firm is
again dependent on output and labour. But now a profit is allowed, which is transferred
to the municipality. The utility function of the municipality shows utility depending on
the output of the firm and on the profit transfer. Moreover, minimum utilities are intro-
duced for both players. For the given demand and production functions there are combi-
nations of Pareto-optimal profit and output level from which a solution should be cho-
sen. These combinations also lead to the combinations of utilities, forming a utility
frontier. The best solution in favour of the powerful principal is where the principal re-
ceives its maximum utility and the public firm achieves minimum utility.
However, the principal may not be as powerful as mentioned above for various rea-
sons. These can include, for example, (a) dependencies of the local economy on the
services and goods produced by the municipal firm (in areas of electricity, transporta-
tion, water supply, tourism and culture, etc.) or the knowledge and skills of the man-
agement of the public firm, and (b) a favourable relation of the management of the pub-
lic firm to the management of a municipal savings bank or mutual political support.
Then the players have to negotiate to find a solution including a combination of utilities
and of output and profits. However, there is a consequence of such solutions, depending
on the location, which again forms an own utility frontier, from which a Nash solution
can be derived giving the fee level of the public enterprise.
3.2.4.  Model Including Political Determinations
Furthermore models may refer – on the part of the principal – to political goals such as
winning elections or maximising votes. If the model developed by Pelzman (1971 and
1976) and Ziemes (1992) is adapted to our theory of public firm (see Figure 4) the prin-
cipal is interested in vote maximisation whereas the public firm tries to maximise utility.
However, this model also concerns price policies and tackles price-setting in two mar-
kets referring to different voters.
11 We investigated one public enterprise that sells in
                                                
11 With Peltzman (1971 and 1976) and Ziemes (1992) not utility but profit is maximised by the public
firm. Although the profit maximisation is generally restricted for public enterprises (Friedrich, 1969;
Püttner, 1985; Detig, 2004), some public enterprises (especially in the industrial sector) try to achieve
such goals. Then the U curves are utility curves of the management of the public enterprise if imputa-
tion of the fixed costs to the productions are given. Formally our solutions are the same as that of
Ziemes (1992), but the management utility is used instead of profits (see Figure 12). If there is no pre-24
monopolistic markets (Feng and Friedrich, 2004). The utility of the public enterprise
increases with the price reductions until a utility maximum is reached but decreases
when price cuts continue. This is demonstrated in Figure 8 by curves U1 and U2 refer-
ring to the different levels of utilities. Indifference curves that reflect price combinations
are derived. The curve P shows all price combinations that yield the same utility.
Figure 8: Utility indifference curves
Price P1
P
       U1 Indifference curves
of utility related to
prices P1 and P2
     Utility U1 Price P2
    U2
Indifference curves of utility
U1+U2
   Utility U2
Voters dislike high prices of public enterprises. Therefore, the curves A1 and A2 result
with respect to votes in Figure 9. For votes a curve V is delineated that shows all price
combinations at both markets of public services leading to the same amounts of votes.
Points of tangency between the curves V and P in Figure 10 show a path of Pareto-
optimal combination of prices ZM for the principal (political interested owner) and the
agent that give maximal utility at given votes or maximal votes at given utility.
The respective combination of utilities are shown in Figure 11, in which the votes are
depicted vertically and the utilities horizontally. If a very powerful principal (owner) is
assumed, he determines a low utility (eventually zero) and a maximum of votes in point
Z. If the agent is overwhelmingly powerful he asks for his maximum utility at point M
leaving the principal with the resulting votes. We can introduce the minimum utility in
order to ensure the activities of the public enterprises or the minimum votes for the
                                                                                                                                              
determined fixed cost imputation, then the P-curve follows from the fixed cost distribution, which al-
lows the highest utility out of both productions.25
principal necessary to avoid privatisation etc. Again a Nash solution can be achieved at
point N. In this case the political influence of the owner leads to relatively low prices.
Figure 9: Indifference curves of votes
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Figure 10: Pareto-optimal path of fees
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Figure 11: Nash-solution for fees
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3.2.5. Model Considering Regional Competition
However, if the public enterprises compete against each other as well, the payoff is ad-
ditionally determined by a duopoly solution embedded in the model above (Friedrich,
1988). For one competitor the solution above is determined for a given fee of the com-
petitor (Friedrich, 1998).
12 Following this assumption a Launhardt-Hotelling solution
can be elaborated yielding the payoffs. The solutions of the duopolies and municipal
competition can also give other results related to employment, price, output, vote, use of
land etc. A double – two-level – regional competition among municipalities owing pub-
lic enterprises and charging fees and the direct competition among the fee collecting
municipal enterprises can also be modelled (Friedrich, 1998; Lindemann, 1999).
As the horizontal competitive solutions are so difficult to model, we may choose a
different modification of our theory. We use the principal-agent version of our model
and refer to the monopoly case. But we introduce a competitive situation W of the mu-
nicipality and the valuation of the financial target described as F is expressed by gF(W)
– see Figure 12. The municipality and the municipal enterprise negotiate about fixing
the financial scope F as well as the volume X to be produced and the fee P to be
charged. The utility of municipality UG depends on output X (or votes depending on
output) and its contribution F to the municipal budget (UG=X+gF(W)•F). The utility of
management of the public firm UU depends on output X and employment L. Both nego-
tiators want to realise, each for himself, a minimum utility level. The situation of the
                                                
12 If there are two competitors a sequence of optimal fees results according to the fees determined by the
competitor. This corresponds to a reaction function of the competitor related to P1 and P2. The so-
called Launhardt-Hotelling solution is achieved where these functions of the competitors intersect
against each other.27
firm shows production, demand, cost and finance functions. As derived above an area
for possible negotiation solutions referring to financial contribution, the output volume
X, the fee, and the respective utilities of the negotiators are determined. By bargaining
according to the Nash a solution is found and the fee is again determined (Figure 12).
Figure 12: Fees in case of regional competition
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If the financial contribution is of high importance, then gF(W)  also turns out to be high.
If the competitive pressure W on the municipality is high, it requires high financial
contributions from public firms, for example, casinos, lotteries, trade fair companies,
etc. The owner tries to apply a high price policy mostly against the desire of the public28
firm. If the municipality uses the public enterprise directly for competitive purposes
such as with real estate companies, business promotion agencies or in direct infrastruc-
ture or industrial competition such as wineries, farms, manufacturing firms or holiday
resorts, sports facilities, municipal tourist firms etc., a higher W in turn leads to a
smaller gF(W). A tendency to a lower financial contribution leads to higher outputs and
lower fees.
4.  Concluding Remarks on Increase of Municipal Fiscal Autonomy
through Fees
The development of municipal public finance during the last decade demonstrates that
(a) municipal expenditures have been rapidly growing in European countries but local
tax increases are not easily enforceable anymore, (b) central government interventions
with grants have intensified, (c) municipalities have been forced to carry out budget
consolidation caused by the fiscal stress, while they have experienced a reduction in
fiscal autonomy at the same time.
Some serious attempts appear to be necessary to help local governments in order to
ensure their fiscal autonomy. One possibility would be the increase in fees as the local
revenue source. The concerns over the distortionary effects of tax financing, fairness
and a desire to make costs more perceptible to consumers are all factors that potentially
support increases in the scope of user charges. In previous years the issues on fees lev-
ied by local governments and their optimum sum have not been adequately investigated
by public finance experts.
The different aims underlying municipal fee policies signal the dependence of fee
formation on the various possible goals. Thus various factors determine the level of
fees, such as a welfare function, consumers’ willingness to pay, sales, costs, willingness
to pay in favour or against external effects, the jurisdictional levels like the EU, the na-
tion, the region, a municipality, indicators for success in competition such as market
shares, outputs, indicators as employment, production, migration, centrality of a mu-
nicipality, growth rates, budget sizes, political indicators such as number of votes,
shared jobs by party members, staffing politically important posts, and many indicators
to show administrative success, such as the number of beds in hospital, square meters of
cleaned roads, number of pretended cases of crime, school children, and tourists, tons of
water supply, etc. or environmental indicators such as tons of waste, volume of SO2,
CO2, etc. Therefore, according to the various goals quite different fees can result, al-
though in some countries the benefit principle should be applied in practice. Mostly the
benefit principle is interpreted as cost coverage principle. However, there are some ex-29
ceptions, thus for some fees this principle is merely a guideline. For example in Ger-
many a profit should be small and less than 14% above costs (Rogosch, 1988). On the
other hand, deficits are allowed or tolerated to better achieve environmental, educational
or social aims. Moreover, cost coverage does not imply a well-defined principle. As
municipalities have organisational autonomy and the laws concerning fee formation are
not very clear, costs can be defined in different ways. For instance municipalities are
able to control costs within their types of costs accounting – departmental costs ac-
counting or their own cost unit accounting (Friedrich, 1998). As a consequence, they
can allocate their costs according to their aims to result in high or low fees.
The approaches in positive theory of fixing fees show us that additional factors play a
role. The aims and utility functions of management and owners lead to different fees.
Not only the situations and market forms in vertical and horizontal competition con-
nected with the public firm but also (regional and) municipal competition are relevant.
Apart from pricing policies the fixing of other parameters of action by administrative
units and public firms can also cause quite different fees. Moreover, types of production
functions, requirements concerning management organisation, factor prices, budget dis-
tribution systems, taxation, subsidisation, legal forms of public firms or public adminis-
trative units, and local statues and laws determine the fees as well.
Compared to the fiscal situation in which all other modes of finance and the volume
of revenues are given, a budget increase can be achieved when the formation of fees
with respect to providing a fixed amount of services is possible. This also applies even
if the turnover resulting from the fees does not cover cost. However if the municipality
can choose the output of services and provide a higher volume of services than before,
the inherent loss may lead to a shrinking budget. As far as legal requirements force the
municipalities just to cover costs, their fiscal autonomy cannot be significantly im-
proved by collecting fees. Insofar as they allocate costs adequately in the course of their
cost assessment, their fiscal situation may be enhanced by causing hidden profits. If no
losses occur, fiscal autonomy is widened by financing higher volumes of municipal ac-
tivities with user charges. Moreover, the fiscal situation of a municipality may be im-
proved by avoiding losses with appropriately higher fees. When a municipality is able to
achieve reasonable non-maximal profits, it can improve its fiscal autonomy. In cases
where municipalities are free to set fees, profit transfers may lead to sustainable im-
provements of fiscal autonomy. Fees can also improve fiscal autonomy if projects and
productions are jointly financed by the municipality and other authorities, for such a co-
operation enables the local government to contribute its own financial share more eas-
ily. Through the provision of charged services the municipality may additionally be able
to acquire conditional grants thus increasing fiscal autonomy. Moreover there may be30
restrictions on public debts which can be eased in case of local activities related to fi-
nancial receipts through fees.
Therefore, municipalities should be careful in selling their public firms or
outsourcing their own production. The basis for fee financing is public property and
public production. In the case of privatisation the benefits from fees are transferred to
the private sector, and it is not guaranteed that private production will lead to higher
municipal revenues or even smaller costs. Often, additional tax revenues from private
owners are not expected as those fee-collecting institutions are often taxed like private
firms in taxation. They are subject to sales taxes and other taxes like business tax, cor-
porate income tax, real estate tax etc. If the municipalities give up their production and
sell their public firms, a control of the local (regional) economy is less effective. There-
fore, policy-making to improve the fiscal autonomy becomes more difficult.
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